Indemnity Among Joint Tort-Feasors in New York: Active and Passive Negligence and Impleader by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 28 Issue 4 Article 7 
1959 
Indemnity Among Joint Tort-Feasors in New York: Active and 
Passive Negligence and Impleader 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Indemnity Among Joint Tort-Feasors in New York: Active and Passive Negligence and Impleader, 28 
Fordham L. Rev. 782 (1959). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol28/iss4/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
valid causes of action now in jeopardy because of the arbitrary pleading
requirements, but also of freeing the courts from an illogical adherence to a
rule founded most probably in the concept of privity in the negligence law.
INDEMNITY AMONG JOINT TORT-FEASORS IN NEW YORK:
ACTIVE AND PASSIVE NEGLIGENCE AND IMPLEADER
The principle of indemnity rests on the theory that "one liable only by reason
of a duty imposed by law for consequences flowing from the negligent conduct
of another, and not an actual participant in that conduct, may recover over
against the active perpetrator of the wrong."' Thus, indemnity is awarded to
one legally liable but morally innocent as against the actual wrongdoer whose
conduct has caused liability to be imposed on him.2
Indemnity is often confused with contribution, though the two are distin-
guishable. Indemnity shifts the entire economic loss from the party who has
been compelled to pay to the tort-feasor chiefly responsible for that loss;8
contribution distributes the loss proportionately among the tort-feasors.4 At
common law a joint tort-feasor who had discharged the claim of the injured
plaintiff had no right of contribution from the other wrongdoer.a The common
law rule has taken frequent and vigorous criticism, and has been ameliorated
by statute in many jurisdictions. In New York section 211-a of the Civil
Practice Act6 allows contribution if there is a joint money judgment against
the tort-feasors, and one has paid more than his pro rata share. A right to in-
demnity, however, could be enforced at common law by a separate action of
1. 4 Shearman & Redfield, A Treatise on the Law of Negligence § 894 (rev. ed. 1941).
2. Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts 512 (1926). It should be noted that the
principle of indemnity is not restricted to negligence actions, though it is primarily that
aspect which will be considered herein.
3. Meriam & Thornton, Indemnity Between Tort-feasors: An Evolving Doctrine in the
New York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 845 (1950).
4. See Prosser, Torts § 46 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
5. See Note, Indemnity among Tort-feasors in New York, 39 Cornell L.Q. 484 (1954).
The rule that there is no contribution between those who are regarded as joint tort-feasors
when one has discharged the claim of the injured plaintiff had its origin in Merryweather
v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). The early American courts,
however, applied the rule against contribution to situations of wilful misconduct, refusing
to extend it to negligence or mistake. Soon the courts lost sight of the origin and reason
for the rule and applied it generally, refusing even to permit contribution where inde-
pendent though concurrent or even successive negligence caused a single result. Prosser
§ 46. Its adoption by the early New York courts was justified on the ground of public
policy. See, e.g., Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns Ch. R. 131 (N.Y. 1816).
6. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 211-a provides: "Where a money judgment has been recovered
jointly against two or more defendants in an action for a personal injury or for property
damage, and such judgment has been paid in part or in full by one or more of such de-
fendants, each defendant who has paid more than his own pro rata share shall be entitled
to contribution from the other defendants with respect to the excess so paid over. .... "
For a good analysis of this provision see Gregory, Tort Contribution Practice in New
York, 20 Cornell L.Q. 269 (1935).
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the indemnitee against the claimed indemnitor after damages had been paid.7
Today, in New York, statutes also permit the indemnitee to assert his right
by means of impleader and cross-claim.8
What is this right and how is it to be enforced? These are the questions,
among others, which this comment will explore.
ORIG S oF THE RULE
Municipalities
As far back as the 1870's a municipality which, by reason of its common
law duty to keep streets in a safe condition, had been subjected to and had paid
a judgment, was held to be entitled to indemnification from the active tort-
feasor, usually a trolley-car company or some other person who possessed a
license to use the streets for his own advantage, and who was directly responsi-
ble for the resulting injury.9 Initially the municipality's right to indemnifica-
tion was found in covenants to repair which, by bond, the tort-feasor had ex-
ecuted in favor of the municipality. 0
The court in City of Rochester v. Montgmnery" went further and reasoned
that when the city is held "primarily liable" to an injured pedestrian, it is
entitled to a recovery due to the contractor's "unlawful or negligent" act. This
test was more definitively enunciated in Village of Port Jcri'is v. First Nat'l
Bank,'2 where the court pointed out that "this liability grows out of the affirma-
tive act of the defendant and renders him liable not only to the party
injured, but also mediately liable to any party who has been damnified
by his neglect. Liability in such a case is predicated upon the negligent
character of the act which caused the injury and the general principle
of law which makes a party responsible for the consequences of his own
wrongful conduct."' 3 However, the court also subscribed to the theory that
7. Although it would seem the argument that one tort-feasor should not recover for
his own wrong would apply also to indemnity, the courts have been more liberal in this
area. Prosser § 46.
8. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 193-a provides that a defendant may bring in any person not
a party to the action who "is or may be liable to him" for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him provided such claim is related to the main action by a common question
of law or fact. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 264 provides that where the judgment may determine
the ultimate rights of a party who claims that another party to the action "is or may be
liable to him for all or part of a claim asserted against him" such part), must demand
such determination in his pleading. The controversy shall not delay the judgment in the
main controversy, unless the court directs otherwise.
9. Note, 39 Cornell L.Q. 484, 485 (1954).
10. City of Brooldyn v. Brooldyn City R.R., 47 N.Y. 475 (1872). See also City of
Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N.Y. 405, 441, 25 N.E. 937, 938 (1890), where the court as-
serted that "if the municipality has provided by contract with third persons for keeping
its street in repair, and has been, through a neglect by such party to perform his contract,
subjected to damages at the suit of an injured party, it may recover from such party the
sum which it has thus been compelled to pay."
11. 72 N.Y. 65 (1878).
12. 96 N.Y. 550 (1884).
13. Id. at 555.
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the contractor, by receiving a license from the city, impliedly agreed to perform
the work "in such a manner as to save the public from danger and the munici-
pality from liability."'14
The reasoning of Village of Port Jervis persisted in cases 1 that followed, and
in Toth v. Kennedy & Smith'6 it was held that where the contractor has ob-
tained a building license from the city, the city could recover either on a theory
of an implied agreement to indemnify or on a theory of active-passive negli-
gence. 17
Expansion of the Rule Beyond Municipalities
The right of indemnification which originated in favor of municipalities was
shortly thereafter extended to landlords who, having been held liable for
dangerous conditions on their premises, sought to recover against third-party
lessees who created the conditions. Thus, the court in Oceanic Steam Nav. Co.
v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola'8 reasoned that the party who had been
held legally liable for another's personal neglect and had paid damages which
"ought to" have been paid by the wrongdoer was entitled to indemnity whether
contractual relations existed between them or not. The court held there was a
cause of action over against the sublessee who had been in complete control of
the premises when the accident happened.
The Oceanic decision made it clear enough that indemnification was not
limited to cases involving street defects, nor was it necessarily founded on ex-
press contractual grounds.'l Shortly thereafter, contractors who had been held
liable to property owners were permitted to recover over against their sub-
contractors who had created the dangerous conditions on the premises. In
Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co.20 the court, noting that the contract be-
tween the subcontractor and the contractor contained no express stipulation
that the contractor was to be indemnified against liability or loss arising from
the subcontractor's negligence, nevertheless felt that the wrongdoer stood in
the relation of indemnitor to the contractor who had been held liable for
14. Id. at 556.
15. See, e.g., Doyle v. Union Ry., 276 N.Y. 453, 12 N.E.2d 541 (1938); Branch v.
Town of Eastchester, 258 App. Div. 727, 14 N.Y.S.2d 863 (2d Dep't 1939); Fortune v. City
of Syracuse, 191 Misc. 738, 78 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. Ct. 1948). A different principle, however,
was applied where the city was sued for injuries due to the unsafe condition of a sidewalk,
with the city being able to recover from the abutting owner only where he caused the
condition leading to the accident or failed to maintain in safe condition an installation
placed there for the "special benefit" of the property. For cases illustrating this and for
the distinction made where the city has undertaken to repair the defect and has done so
negligently, see Note, 39 Cornell L.Q. 484, 487-88 (1954).
16. 259 App. Div. 855, 19 N.Y.S.2d 517 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd mem., 285 N.Y. 579, 33
N.E.2d 249 (1941).
17. That this is still the criterion for upholding the municipality's right of recovery
over, see Burke v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.2d 90, 138 N.E.2d 332, 157 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
18. 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892).
19. For a good evaluation of this expansion see Comment, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 845
(1950).
20. 175 N.Y. 214, 67 N.E. 439 (1903).
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the property damage. The contractor could recover, however, only if he had
actually paid some of the sums for which he had been held liable.2 1
The application of the rule to the contractor-subcontractor situation was
more explicit in Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Creem.2 2 The court, again noting that
the right of indemnity did not depend upon the presence of an indemnity bond
when an agreement to indemnify could be implied from the circumstances,
distinguished the liability imposed by mere omission of a legal duty from that
imposed by personal participation in an affirmative act of negligence or from
knowledge of or acquiescence in an act or omission. Although both the con-
tractor and subcontractors were equally liable to third-parties for the neglect
of duty which resulted in the injury, as between the two, the contractor by
virtue of the contractual relationship was entitled to rely upon the subcontrac-
tors' discharge of that duty. The contractor could be deprived of his right of
indemnity only by proof that he in fact participated in the negligence beyond
a mere omission to perform the duty imposed on both by law. The rule was
further extended to include property owners who sought indemnification from
other persons, such as deliverymen, who created dangerous conditions on the
premises which had cast the owner in damages.P
Although it was demonstrated the indemnity rule was not to be limited to a
particular factual situation or to specified relationships between the parties,
the rule governing liability at this point was merely a statement that one party
"ought" to pay damages as between himself and another.2 4 The courts were
attempting to do justice by placing the loss on the party ultimately responsible
but had formulated no clear standards for shifting damages. The decisions
were full of "verbal formulae" which described the result reached but offered
no explanation of why indemnity was allowed or refused.25
The cases had thus far made it clear that recovery could be had either on
the basis of a consensual agreement or on a quasi-contractual theoryy 0 An
express indemnity contract or consensual agreement could be of two kinds:
"sweeping," i.e., where the indemnitor agreed to save the indemnitee harmless
from any loss or liability regardless of indemnitee's own negligence and even if
the indemnitee's negligence were the sole cause of injury; or "limited," i.e.,
where the indemnitor agreed to protect the indemnitee from liability for in-
21. The court made the interesting observation that the contractor did not have to
await judgment before paying the property owners, but could have done so voluntarily and
still have obtained indemnity against the subcontractor if he were the primary wrongdoer.
Id. at 218, 67 N.E. at 440. This is not true under existing procedure since recovery of
judgment against the defendant is a condition of recovery against a third-party. See, e.g.,
Verder v- Schack, 90 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
22. 102 App. Div. 354, 92 N.Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dep't 1905), afi'd mem., 185 N.Y. 580,
78 N.E. 1110 (1906).
23. See Scott v. Curtis, 195 N.Y. 424, 8 N.E. 794 (1909).
24. For cases illustrating this and for the distinction made where the injury occurred
months after the job was finished or after the work was accepted by the owner, see Note,
39 Cornell L.Q. 484, 489 (1954).
25. For a good discussion of this point see Comment, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 845, 848-49
(1950).
26. See 42 C.J.S. Indemnity §§ 4, 20 (1944).
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demnitor's own negligence. 27  Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co.2 8
held that the sweeping indemnity contract had to show an intention to in-
demnify a party against his own negligence expressed "in unequivocal terms,"
for here was an instance where recovery could be had by the active wrong-
doer. Where there was no such sweeping agreement, recovery had to be made
under common law principles. The limited indemnity contract, in effect, merely
expressed contractually the same liability which the law would impose anyway
where the indemnitee was merely passively negligent and the indemnitor actively
negligent. 29 As the active-passive negligence rule was to govern recovery ex-
cept when there was a sweeping agreement, which was rather uncommon,
further clarification of the standard was necessary.
THE RuLE-TESTS A-ND STANDAIDS
An attempt to explain more fully the active-passive rule that was taking
shape in the courts was made in Tipaldi v. Riverside Memorial Chapel.8 0
There the court said that it made no difference, as regards indemnity, whether
the fault of the primary wrongdoer was an act of commission or omission.
Adler v. Tully & Di Napoli, Inc.,31 raised the next logical question; what
effect does the defendant's knowledge of a defect have on his right to in-
demnity? The court had previously, in Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Constr.
Corp.,32 drawn a distinction between actual and constructive knowledge and
equated actual knowledge with the active negligence which bars recovery
over.33 Dolnick v. Donner Lumber Corp.34 indicated that even constructive
knowledge could be equated with active negligence if a party had a duty to
acquire actual knowledge and failed to do so. A dictum in the later case of
Falk v. Crystal Hall3 stated that there was no difference between actual and
27. Comment, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 714, 715 (1957).
28. 271 N.Y. 36, 2 N.E.2d 35 (1936).
29. Comment, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 714, 715 (1957). For a good illustration how the
absence or presence of an express contract of indemnity can affect the scope of liability,
see Dudar v. Milef Realty Corp., 258 N.Y. 415, 180 N.E. 102 (1932), where the owner was
claiming indemnity from the subcontractor who had negligently injured a third-party by
operation of a hod hoist. The court there stated: "In the absence of a contractual obligation
by the operator of the hod hoist, assuming sole responsibility for the results of its own
negligence, the question of ultimate liability as between the two defendants might be
debatable .... Here the contractor did by express agreement assume such responsibility."
Id. at 422, 180 N.E. at 105. Cf. John Wanamaker, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 228 N.Y.
192, 126 N.E. 718 (1920).
30. 273 App. Div. 414, 78 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 298 N.Y. 686, 82 N.E.2d
585 (1948).
31. 274 App. Div. 1001, 84 N.Y.S.2d 305 (2d Dep't 1948), aff'd mem., 300 N.Y. 662,
91 N.E.2d 323 (1950).
32. 290 N.Y. 145, 48 N.E.2d 299 (1943).
33. See Comment, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 845, 854 (1950).
34. 275 App. Div. 954, 89 N.Y.S.2d 783 (2d Dep't 1949), aff'd mem., 300 N.Y. 660, 91
N.E.2d 322 (1950).
35. 200 Misc. 979, 105 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd mem., 279 App. Div. 1071,
113 N.Y.S2d 277 (lst Dep't), appeal denied, 304 N.Y. 987, 108 N.E.2d 410 (1952).
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constructive knowledge, as constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition
could impose an affirmative duty. This dictum was apparently rejected by
the appellate division in Raping v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co.30
The cases had all spoken of active and passive negligence, but what these
terms meant was still far from clear. The court in McFall v. Compagnic
Maritime Bege07 attempted to resolve this confusion in terminology. There
was stated what was to become a criterion in later cases: The question whether
negligence is active or passive is generally one of fact for the jury and, in
effect, the terms "active" and "passive" are simply guides for a jury in deciding
which of the several wrongdoers is more responsible for the injury.3s Though
this principle and practice were generally accepted, it soon became obvious that
confusion was by no means dissipated. Meltzer v. Temple Estatesa9 again
clouded the picture by stating that only where there was room for a reasonable
difference of opinion as to the "comparative culpability" of the joint tort-feasors
would the question of "liability over" be given to the jury. Otherwise it would
be disposed of as a point of law. Thus, it would seem that if the confusion that
has arisen by attempting to fit cases into bare cubicles of easy nomenclature
is to be alleviated, it can be done only by realizing that no rule really governs
in the field of indemnity.
Obviously, no hard and fast rules can be laid down. Nevertheless, a few
general observations may be of value. The decisions turn on a disparity in
culpability between the parties, with the more negligent party being held liable
over to the less negligent.40 This disparity would seem to be a mixed question
of law and fact. The jury must ultimately determine whether the difference in
36. 283 App. Div. 204, 126 N.Y.S.2d 687 (3d Dep't 1953). Plaintiff, having been in-
jured by an exploding bottle, sued the storekeeper who tried to implead both the bottle
manufacturer and bottler. The lower court had denied impleader, reasoning that the
storekeeper was actively negligent in not discovering the defect. The appzllate division
reversed, and granted impleader as it felt that the storekeeper might have been only
passively negligent in not detecting the flaw in the bottle, thus determining that despite
Falk v. Crystal Hall, supra note 35, there was a difference between actual and constructive
knowledge. For a suggestion that the Falk dictum may not be inconsistent with the facts
of this case see Note, 39 Cornell L.Q. 484, 499 (1954).
37. 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952).
38. See Note, 39 Cornell L.Q. 484, 499 (1954).
39. 203 Misc. 602, 116 N.Y.S.2d 546 (N.Y. City Ct. 1952).
40. A good illustration of what constitutes such a disparity is Harrington v. 615 West
Corp, 2 N.Y.2d 476, 141 N.E.2d 602, 161 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1957), wherein a tenant tripped
over a rope securing the scaffold of a painting contractor engaged by the landlord and
brought suit against the contractor and the landlord, who in turn cross-caimed against
the contractor. The court, pointing out that both the landlord and contractor should
have recognized that a tenant might trip over the rope, determined that each was under an
equal duty to warn the tenant of the danger, and as the negligence of one was not primary
in comparison with that of the other, neither being actively negligent, dismissed the cross-
claim. The court did state, however, that if the contractor had been negligent in the
manner in which he rigged the rope, indemnification of the owner might then have been
possible, the theory being that improperly rigging a scaffold involves a different kind of
negligence than merely failing to warn a tenant of a possible danger.
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culpability is such as to merit recovery, but it is the responsibility of the
judge to determine whether the nature of the parties' actions justifies turning
the matter over to the jury. It is the latter consideration which raises the
problem. Probably the most significant observation is that almost universally
the party allowed recovery over has been held liable only by virtue of an omis-
sion of duty, and it seems that had the party's liability been grounded upon
an affirmative act the result would be different. In fact, the New York Court
of Appeals recently said: "[I]t seems . . . that one cannot be guilty of
passive negligence merely, if he has been guilty of a fault of commission.1 41
In many of the cases where indemnity has been allowed there was a con-
tractual relationship between the parties. Thus, the question is raised whether
this feature may have influenced the courts in reaching their decisions. Indeed,
it might be argued that insistence on the existence of a contractual relationship
would provide a simple and certainly clearer guide, and making a contractual
relationship the exclusive test, as was eventually done in maritime cases, 42
would do away with some of the uncertainty surrounding indemnity. It has,
however, been repeatedly said that indemnity would be granted if the facts
so warranted, whether or not a contractual relationship was found, on the
equities involved, this being clearly in accord with the theory that indemnity
is essentially an equitable doctrine.43  Thus, the rules of law surrounding
indemnity inevitably have to be elastic and lacking in definiteness. The
basic policy inquiry in all cases is who in fairness and equity is at fault here?
Any requirement devised by the courts is only a means by which this basic
test of fairness is sought to be applied. 44
STATUTORY LIABILITY
Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law
Section 59 of the New York Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law4  as well as
respondeat superior46 make an employer liable to a third-party for the negligent
41. Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 456, 158 N.E.2d 691, 696, 186 N.Y.S.2d
15, 22 (1959). The court went on to say: "It is the omission or failure to perform a
nondelegable type of duty (e.g., the duty of an owner of realty or a shipowner to furnish
the injured party with a safe place to work), as distinguished from the failure to observe
for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, which constitutes passive negligence entitling one
to indemnity." Ibid.
42. See, e.g., Weyerhauser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
43. Note, 42 Va. L. Rev. 959, 975 (1956).
44. Comment, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 845, 861-62 (1950). It has been said that indemnity
is based altogether upon the law's notion, influenced by an equitable background of what
is fair and proper between the parties. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity between
Tort-feasors, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 130, 147 (1932).
45. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 59 provides: "Every owner of a motor vehicle ...
operated upon a public highway shall be liable ... for ... injuries to person or property
resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle ...by any person ...
using or operating the same with the permission ...of such owner."
46. See, e.g., Traub v. Dinzler, 309 N.Y. 395, 131 N.E.2d 564 (1955); Smart v. Morard,
124 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1953). While strong public policy requires injured parties in
[Vol. 28
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conduct of his employee in the operation of the employer's motor vehicle.
Such an employer, being only passively negligent at best, has a right of
indemnification against his employee. The question, however, is really academic.
Not only are such suits often barred by union contracts, but consideration of
employee morale and the betterment of personnel relations discourage the
employer from enforcing his remedies against his own employees. Moreover,
the typical insurance policy covers not only the owner but anyone who is
operating the vehicle with his consent.
The Labor Law
Section 241 of the New York Labor Law provides that contractors and prop-
erty owners, when constructing or demolishing buildings or doing excavation
work, must comply with certain requirements for the safety of workmen. When
a subcontractor signs an express indemnity agreement, is the agreement actu-
ally available to contractors and owners or is it in effect nullified because of
the statutory duty imposed on the landowner or contractor by section 241?
In Walters v. Rao Elec. Equip. Co. 47 and Scnanchuck v. Fifth Ave. "
Thirty-Seventh St. Corp.,48 the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that for
purposes of indemnity the legislature in enacting section 241 had discarded
the common law distinction between active and passive negligence and that,
as the duty imposed was nondelegable, the statute's violation per se constituted
the tort-feasor actively negligent. From these cases the so-called Walters rule
evolved. In essence it provided that indemnity will be given a party held
liable to an injured workman for failure to furnish protection in accordance
with section 241 as against an actively negligent joint tort-feasor only where
there is an express agreement which "unequivocally expressed" an intention to
indemnify the tort-feasor for his own violation of the statutory duties of section
241. In other words, where a violation of section 241 is involved, the matter
becomes one of strict contract construction.
Rufo v. Orlando49 extended the Walters rule to the Rules of the Board of
Standards and Appeals promulgated pursuant to section 24 1.rm The court
automobile accidents to be furnished with a responsible defendant, any distortion of a
fault concept should be limited to making the injured party whole. Although the moral
innocence of the employer or owner is ignored so that the injured third-party has a de-
fendant who can pay judgment, he should not be penalized by denial of recovery from
the one actually at fault. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 71.10 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Larson]; Restatement, Restitution § 96 (1937); 42 C.J.S. Indemnity
§ 21 (1944).
47. 289 N.Y. 57, 43 N.E.2d 810 (1942) (suit by employee of contractor against con-
tractor and subcontractor under N.Y. Lab. Law § 241(4)).
48. 290 N.Y. 412, 49 N.E.2d 507 (1943) (suit by employee of contractor against con-
tractor and subcontractor under N.Y. Lab. Law § 241(5)).
49. 309 N.Y. 345, 130 N.E.2d 887 (1955).
50. N.Y. Lab. Law § 241 provides: "All contractors and owners, when constructing or
demolishing buildings ... shall comply with the following requirements.... The board
of standards and appeals may make rules to provide for the protection of workmen in
connection with the excavation work for the construction of buildings, the work of con-
structing or demolishing buildings and structures, and the guarding of dangerous machinery
1959-60]
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reasoned that since the legislature had abolished, in section 241, the distinction
between active and passive tort-feasors, the rules and regulations which were
to implement that section could not be construed to alter such an intent.01
Although Wischnie v. Dorsck52 recognized and Semanchuck indicated by dictaa
that only in section 241 of the Labor Law did the legislature make the old
common law distinction between active and passive negligence inapplicable,
some lower courts extended and continue to extend the Walters rule to other
sections of the Labor Law,5 4 and even to provisions of the Administrative Code
of the City of New York. 55
Criticism
There may be merit to the argument that the Walters rule is an expression
of sound public policy insofar as it seeks to impose a high standard of care on
all parties concerned and to insure the plaintiff an existing and responsible de-
fendant.5" However, once the injured party has been made whole there is no
sound reason to change the rules regarding the allocation of financial liability
among the tort-feasors.57
used in connection therewith, and the owners and contractors for such work shall comply
therewith."
51. It is interesting to note that recovery in Rufo v. Orlando, 309 N.Y. 345, 130 N.E.2d
887 (1955), could have been denied on common law principles for, as the court pointed
out, the verdict in favor of the laborer necessarily implied a finding that the trench was
not reasonably safe for the purposes for which it was to be used, and the contractor
who was to excavate was affirmatively negligent in creating a dangerous condition at
the excavation site. Any negligence of the general contractor would merely have established
both as active joint tort-feasors.
52. 296 N.Y. 257, 72 N.E.2d 700 (1947) (N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 255, 316, do not impose
the same active, primary, nondelegable duty on an owner as does N.Y. Lab. Law § 241).
53. The court stated it felt that the Waiters rule should not be extended into a field
where indemnity was claimed for liability imposed by failure to perform a nondelegable
duty in construction and demolition work not arising under the New York Labor Law.
Semanchuck v. Fifth Ave. & Thirty-Seventh St. Corp., 290 N.Y. 412, 419-22, 49 N.E.2d
507, 509-10 (1943).
54. Chideckel v. Dime Say. Bank, 103 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (failure to furnish
safe tools as required by N.Y. Lab. Law § 240); Morris v. Attula, 74 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Sup.
Ct. 1947) (failure to furnish anchors for window cleaners). Although there is no case
extending the rule to N.Y. Lab. Law § 241-a, it would appear that a contractor violating
this section is also to be considered an active tort-feasor. See, e.g., Duncan v. Twin Leasing
Corp., 283 App. Div. 1080, 131 N.Y.S.2d 423 (2d Dep't 1954); Reilly v. Charles Herman
Contracting Co., 89 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
55. See, e.g., Klein v. Bargray Constr. Corp., 140 N.Y.S.2d 734 (N.Y. City Ct. 1955),
rev'd per curiam, 1 App. Div. 2d 883, 149 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1st Dep't 1956). See also Good
Neighbor Fed'n v. Pathe Indus., 202 Misc. 951, 114 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd
mer., 281 App. Div. 968, 120 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1st Dep't 1953); Storoz v. International
Business Mach. Corp., 91 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd mem., 276 App. Div. 1079,
97 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1st Dep't 1950).
56. See Wischnie v. Dorsch, 296 N.Y. 257, 72 N.E.2d 700 (1947).
57. 2 Larson § 71.10. It might seem that sections of the New York Labor Law other
than § 241 could require such an interpretation, such as the duty to put anchors on building
exteriors for the protection of window cleaners, but even here such a rule dispensing with
common law principles does not seem warranted. For a good development of this point
see Note, 39 Cornell L.Q. 484, 492 (1954).
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The Compensation Statutes
Employers often insure their employees against industrial accidents with
some form of workmen's compensation. The question naturally arises whether
a third-party, sued by an employee, may get contribution or indemnity from
the employer whose negligence has caused or contributed to the injury. This, of
course, will vary with the provisions of the various state statutes.
Section 11 of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law, which is typical
of many statutory provisions, provides: "The liability of an employer . . .
shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever, to such em-
ployee, his personal representatives, husband, parents, dependents, or next of
kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages, at common law or other-
wise on account of such injury or death .... ." The Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 8 has substantially the same exclusive
remedy provision.
Would allowing contribution or indemnity to a third-party cast upon the
employer a burden against which, theoretically, he is protected by the com-
pensation system which abolished the employee's common law remedies against
the employer in return for statutory benefits? 9
Federal Law
The federal courts are divided on the question of recovery over but have
agreed on the distinction between contribution and indemnity; the right of
contribution is recognized as founded on contribution-between-tort-feasor sta-
tutes or on common law or admiralty rules, while the right of indemnity is
based on an independent duty or employer's obligation to the third-party, either
by express contract or implication of law.GO
Contribution
Two rules have evolved regarding contribution. A minority of circuits,
applying admiralty rules, permit limited contribution on the part of the
employer.6 ' However, the majority hold that an employer whose concurring
58. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958). Section 5 provides that "the
liability of an employer ... shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such
employer to the employee ... and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from
such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury... ." 44 Stat. 1426
(1927), 33 US.C. § 905 (1958).
59. At common law an employee could sue his employer for injury due to his negli-
gence, but an employer could plead the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption
of risk and the fellow-servant rule. Today, as a result of compensation legislation, the
employer is absolutely liable whether at fault or not, with the employee receiving only a
limited amount which is, however, certain. Note, 42 Va. L. Rev. 959, 961 (1956). For
persons who are included within the term "third-party" see 2 Larson § 72.00.
60. 2 Larson § 76.10.
61. See, e.g., Portel v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 458 (S.DN.Y. 1949); The Samovar,
72 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1947); The Tampico, 45 F. Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y. 1942).
Contra, American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950); Lo Bue
v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 298 (EDM.N.Y. 1950). Admiralty, unlike the common law,
1959-60]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
negligence contributes to employee's injuries cannot be sued or joined by the
third-party as a joint tort-feasor at common law or under statutes allowing
contribution.62 These courts reason that employee's claim against the em-
ployer is solely for statutory benefits, the liability resting upon the employer
being absolute and irrespective of negligence, while employee's claim against
the third-party is for negligence and thus, being different in kind, cannot result
in common liability for the employer and the third-party.0 3 This was illus-
trated by American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 4 where the court de-
termined that a shipowner and a stevedoring firm, not incurring the same type
of liability to an injured stevedore, could not be joint wrongdoers and denied
contribution to the shipowner from whom the employee recovered. This hold-
ing was reinforced by Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting
Corp.,65 which conclusively established that the "moiety rule" of admiralty
whereby mutual wrongdoers share equally the damages sustained by each, as
well as any personal injury and property damage inflicted on innocent third-
parties, did not apply to noncollision cases.
Indemnity
As to whether the employer is immune to a cause of action founded on
indemnity, two views have also been taken. Some courts construe the exclusive
liability provision in the compensation statute to prohibit a claim of recovery
over against the employer by a third-party, reasoning that such a clause was
intended to limit employer's "over-all liability" in the same degree that it
limits employee's rights against the employer.00 The majority of courts have
adopted a narrower construction and allow indemnity, reasoning that immunity
is provided only against actions for damages on account of employee's injury
and that the third-party's action for indemnity is not for damages "on account
of" employee's injury but for reimbursement "on account of" the breach of
an independent duty owed by the employer to the third-party.0 7
These latter courts have used this "independent duty" idea as a device for
aiding the third-party in circumventing the employer's immunity from suit,
and have found that this independent obligation to indemnify the third-party,
which thus constitutes an exception to the exclusive liability clause, can arise
from: (1) an express contract of indemnity whereby the employer agrees to
indemnify the third-party for the kind of loss the third-party has been com-
pelled to pay to the employee (here problems of interpretation have arisen
such as found in American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello);08 and (2) an implied
does not embrace the idea that the rights between joint tort-feasors arise only common
liability. 2 Larson § 76.22.
62. 2 Larson § 76.21.
63. Ibid.
64. 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950).
65. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
66. See 2 Larson § 76.30.
67. Ibid.
68. 330 U.S. 446 (1947). In this case the Supreme Court construed an indemnity pro-
vision in a contract between the United States and a stevedoring concern, saying that the
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obligation to perform the work with due care as where the employer is a
contractor performing work for the third-party (as found in Read v. United
States) .69
In other cases ° where a contractual relationship between the parties existed,
the courts also applied a test of active or primary negligence. Whether there
exists a third category in which, even in the absence of a contractual relation-
ship, an independent implied duty to indemnify the third-party will arise out
of the sole relationship of two joint tort-feasors, is something upon which the
courts have not yet agreed. Slattery v. Marra Bros.,7 1 held that there can be
no indemnity where the only independent duty is that of primary to secondary
wrongdoer; but the court in United States v. Rotclzhild Int'l Stev.edoring Co.42
speaking of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, held
that although the third-party had created the dangerous condition, employer's
subsequent negligence in permitting his employees to work under such known
conditions was an intervening cause, and allowed the third-party full indemnity
from the employer.
It would seem that the courts were attempting to evolve a quasi-contractual
theory of indemnity involving the active-passive negligence distinction. Starting
with Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic SS. Corp.7 3 however, a definite trend
away from the primary-secondary test is noticeable, at least in the Supreme
Court decisions relating to maritime torts. Rejecting the argument that pay-
ments to the stevedore by his employer under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act barred recovery over by the shipowner, the Su-
preme Court in that case, four justices dissenting, determined that the third-
party complaint was actually for breach of contract, employer stevedoring corn-
liability assuming clause was ambiguous and capable of being interpreted so as to make
the contractor indemnify the United States should the latter be held liable for damages
caused solely by the contractor's negligence or that the contractor reimburse the United
States for all damages caused in any part by the contractor's negligence or that, if the
parties were jointly negligent, the contractor would be responsible for that portion of the
damages which his fault bore to the total fault. Thus, the Court said the intent of the
clause was a question of fact calling for the production of evidence.
69. 201 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953). See generally 2 Larson § 76.43.
70. See, e.g., Berti v. Compagnie De Navigation Cyprien Fabre, 213 F.2d 397 (2d Cir.
1954); Polozzola v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954).
71. 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915 (1951). Judge Hand stated:
"[We shall assume that, when the indemnitor and indemnitee are both liable to the
injured person, it is the law of New Jersey that, regardless of any other relation between
them, the difference in gravity of their faults may be great enough to throw the whole
loss upon one. We cannot, however, agree that that result is rationally possible except
upon the assumption that both parties are liable to the same person for the joint wrong.
If so, when one of the two is not so liable, the right of the other to indemnity must be
found in rights and liabilities arising out of some other legal transaction between the two."
186 F.2d at 139. As there was no contract or legal relationship between the employer and
the third-party, indemnity accordingly was denied.
72. 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1950). Contra, Brown v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211
F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1954).
73. 350 US. 124, 133-34 (1955).
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pany having breached its obligation to the shipowner to perform the work in
a reasonably safe manner. Later cases74 indicate the lengths to which the Su-
preme Court has gone to find a contractual relationship between the parties,
thereby apparently ruling out the alternative quasi-contractual theory of re-
covery in maritime indemnity. These cases reason that a contractual assump-
tion of indemnity by the employer is a voluntary waiver of the limited liability
afforded employees under the Longshoremen's Act while indemnity under a
quasi-contractual theory is recovery over "on account of injury," and hence
precluded by statute.75
New York
The right to contribution among joint tort-feasors in admiralty has in the
past been enforced in New York. However, no such right is enforced against
the employer joint tort-feasor today where the injury is to one of his employees
entitled to compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act. 76  As for indemnity in maritime torts, the decisions of the
federal courts control in New York, and the federal trends are reflected in the
state courts' decisions. Thus, although the McFall case permitted a recovery
over by a shipowner against an injured stevedore's employer on the theory of
common law indemnity, the New York Court of Appeals in the subsequent
case of Merriweather v. Boland & Corneliu77 was careful to point out that a
74. See, e.g., Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co.
v. Nacirema Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
75. For a good analysis of the result of holding that the exclusive liability clause does
not bar an action for indemnity when the parties are in a contractual relationship, see
Weinstock, Employer's Duty to Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered by Harbor
Workers, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 321 (1954). Actually it appears that this whole problem could
be solved by new legislation covering both contribution and indemnity and apportioning
damages awarded to comparative fault. Comment, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 174 (1956).
Larson believes that by inclusion of third-parties within the compensation system injustice
would be alleviated in many cases. 2 Larson § 76.53. For the practicality of this approach
in reference to stevedores and shipowners see Note, 66 Yale L.J. 581, 589-90 (1957).
76. See 2 Carmody & Wait, Cyclopedia of New York Practice § 65 (1952) [hereinafter
cited as Carmody & Wait].
77. 6 N.Y.2d 417, 160 N.E.2d 717, 190 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959) (negligence action by
stevedore against the operator of the ship upon which he was working when injured). The
courts have found that while the remedy of workmen's compensation is exclusive as against
the employer, it does not bar the employee from pursuing his common law tort remedy
as against the third-party. See, e.g., Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros., 267 N.Y. 410, 196 N.E. 308
(1935); Milone v. Bono, 8 Misc. 2d 826, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See also
2 Carmody & Wait § 69. An interesting problem arises as to who is a third-party in
states which have statutes providing that the general contractor will be liable for com-
pensation to employees of the uninsured subcontractor engaged in work for the principal
contractor. Since he is thus made the employer for the purpose of the statute, the majority
of cases have allowed him immunity from common law suit when he has been held liable
for compensation payments. However, where the subcontractor is insured most courts
hold the general contractor a third-party subject to common law suit. 2 Larson § 72.31.
New York has been extreme in this regard. In Sweezey v. Arc. Elec. Constr. Co., 295
N.Y. 306, 67 N.E.2d 369 (1946), the court found the general contractor such a third-party
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third-party plaintiff was entitled to trial of his claim of indemnity, not upon
the theory of active-passive negligence but upon the existence of a contract
with and a warranty by a third-party defendant to perform his duty in a -afe
and seamanlike manner.
State Workmen's Compensation Law
In construing the New York Workmen's Compensation Law the New York
courts have followed the rationale of the federal courts to the extent of refusing
a third-party recovery over against an employer where contribution is sought 8
but sometimes permitting it in the case of indemnification.70
There is no difficulty in finding a right to indemnity where the employer's
obligation springs from an express indemnity agreement. The right is not so
limited. In Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates
Corp.s the court found an implied agreement to indemnify. There a contractor
while building new homes had broken plaintiff utility company's gas main
which ran under a public highway. The escaping gas asphyxiated the con-
tractor's employee in a nearby house. Although the gas company as occupier
of the land had failed to discover the dangerous condition and had not given
warning to the employee at work on the premises, the employer, said the court,
while working near the gas pipes impliedly assumed a duty to the gas company
to use reasonable care in the performance of the work, and having by his own
active negligence caused the break in the line he thereby became obligated to
indemnify the gas company for its damages.8 Thus, a contractual relationship
even though he was also liable for compensation to the subcontractors employee. It
reasoned that the contractor was conditionally liable as a guarantor, for while not bound
to secure compensation he was liable for payment if the subcontractor failed to do so.
The court further pointed out that the basis of the contractor's liability was his relation
to the subcontractor, and that any recovery of compensation by the subcontractors em-
ployee from the general contractor constituted a lien against the money due the sub-
contractor. For a criticism of this holding and a general evaluation of the whole problem
of "contractor-under" statutes, see 2 Larson § 72.31.
78. Although contribution is denied mainly due to the absence of a joint tort-feasor
statute, the court in Edwards v. Sophkirsh Holding Corp., 280 App. Div. 168, 112 N.YS.2d
219 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 304 N.Y. 850, 109 N.E.2d 717 (1952), pointed out that
contribution would be barred by the Workmen's Compensation Law even if there were
joint tort-feasors.
79. See, e.g., Clements v. Rockefeller, 189 Misc. SS5, 70 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. CL 1947),
which involved an action against a landlord for the death of a tenant's employee. The
landlord was permitted to implead the tenant, to whom he had leased the premise, even
though the tenant had complied with the Workmen's Compensation Law. See Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Cochran, 302 N.Y. 545, 99 N.E.2d 8S2 (1951); Mirsky v. Seaich Realty
Co., 256 App. Div. 658, 11 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Ist Dep't 1939).
80. 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
81. Further clarification of this obligation was given in American fut. Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950), where the court, denying contribution to the
third-party against the employer for a claim arising out of a defective rope, pointed out
that the employer owed no duty to inspect the rope to the third-party who had furnished
the item, such a duty running only to his employee, and concluded that to hold the em-
1959-60]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
between the gas company and the employer, which the federal courts would
deem to be essential, is not required in New York.
INSURANCE POLICIES: INDEMNITY FOR CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
Does a clause in an insurance policy excluding coverage for contractual
liability82 embrace the situation where insured enters into a contract of in-
demnity with a third-party thereby assuming any loss or liability which may
be incurred by that party? Such a clause was found operative to exclude
coverage in Union Paving Co. v. Thomas,8 3 but inoperative in United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Virginia Eng'r Co. 84 In the latter case the court pointed
out that the indemnity clause in the construction contract did not assume
liability for which the contractor was not himself liable at law, but merely
expressly protected the owner against liability for which the contractor would
have been responsible anyway, and declared that:
To construe the exclusion clause to relieve the ... [insurer] of liability for such
claim would be to write into the policy a reservation which it does not contain,
and which ...could not have been within the contemplation of the parties. It is
not reasonable to suppose that, when the insured was taking insurance to protect
against liability imposed by law, it was intended to exclude coverage of claims for
which the law imposed liability on the insured, merely because insured had agreed
to protect another against secondary liability on account of such claims. 8r
The two holdings are not necessarily irreconcilable. The court in Virginia
Eng'r Co. recognized the distinction between limited and express indemnity
agreements, but nevertheless felt that insurer and insured had not intended
to exclude coverage where there was an implied in law indemnity obligation.
No such implied in law obligation was before the court in Union Paving Co.
No claim was made that the owner was only passively negligent, and the de-
cision was solely concerned with the indemnity agreement before the court.80
The court of appeals had an opportunity to consider the problem in O'Dowd
v. American Sur. Co.,87 where the insured sought damages against the insurer
ployer had such a duty to the supplier would imply an agreement on the part of the
employer to indemnify the supplier for his own negligence in furnishing such a rope.
82. Typical of these clauses is the one found in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Virginia Eng'r Co., 213 F.2d 109, Ill (4th Cir. 1954), which provided: "This policy
does not apply: (a) to liability assumed by the insured under any contract or agreement
not defined herein."
83. 186 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1951).
84. 213 F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1954).
85. Id. at 112.
86. The court in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Virginia Eng'r Co., 213 F.2d 109
(4th Cir. 1954), even drew notice to the fact that Union Paving Co. v. Thomas, 186 F.2d
172 (3d Cir. 1951), "seemed to have proceeded on the theory that the only liability of the
insured for the injury . . . arose out of the indemnity agreement which it had executed.
Here . . . there was liability on the insured for the injury without reference to the in-
demnity agreement." 213 F.2d at 115. For a good analysis of these cases see Comment,
25 Fordham L. Rev. 714 (1957).
87. 3 N.Y.2d 347, 144 N.E.2d 359, 165 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1957).
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in breach of contract for failure to pay the full amount of a judgment rendered
on an indemnity agreement. The court distinguished the situation here from
Virginia Eng'r Co. because the relative degree of culpability of the insured and
the beneficiary of the indemnity agreement had never been litigated, the de-
terminations in the prior negligence action being consistent either with the
theory that the insured and the indemnitee were joint tort-feasors or that the
insured alone was actively negligent. Finding, in addition, that the insured in
his complaint did not contend that he was actively negligent, it determined
that insured had not sustained the burden of establishing the claim under the
terms of the policy, and found the granting of summary judgment improper.
The court did point out that if at the trial it should develop that the indemnitee
was in pari delicto with the insured, the insurer would be liable only for half the
judgment, but that if it were determined that the insured was the active
wrongdoer, the insurer would be liable for the balance of the judgment.
The Problem in Relation to Workmen's Compensatimo
An assumption clause similar to the one found in American Stcvedores, Inc.
v. Porello was involved in Cardinal v. State.ss Suit was brought by the em-
ployer against New York State for breach of an insurance policy issued by the
State Fund. The policy purported to indemnify an employer against all liability
to his employees under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law and the
Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, against any
other liability imposed by law and to defend any suits or proceedings brought
against him "on account of such injuries," excepting any liability assumed by
the employer under contract. The Fund had refused to undertake employer's
defense of certain maritime actions on the sole ground that the petitions alleged
a contract by the employer to indemnify the United States, the owner of the
ship out of which arose the injuries to employees of the employer which were
the subject matter of the actions. The Fund offered, after the Porello decision,
to defend the impleading petitions on condition that it pay only a minimum
amount if judgments were recovered against the United States. Subsequently,
agreements were reached and all the libels were settled, the United States paying
forty per cent and the employer sixty per cent of the settlement.
The court of appeals said that where an insurer unjustifiedly refuses to
defend suit, insured, after making a reasonable settlement or compromise, is
entitled to reimbursement from the insurer even though the policy purports to
avoid liability if any settlements are made without the insurer's consent. The
only question then was whether the employer had made a reasonable settle-
ment of the injured party's claim, which reasonableness was here conceded.
The court found that the employer was justified in paying sixty per cent of the
settlement because the fault for the accident was at least partly his, since he
had notice of a dangerous condition and had failed to remedy it. Had the
actions gone to trial, the employer would have been liable for half or even all
of the damages.89 Thus, having answered the grounds advanced by the Fund
9S. 304 N.Y. 400, 107 N.E.2d 569 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 918 (1953).
89. The court determined that had the suits been brought to trial under existing
maritime law several results were possible: The employer and the United States could
have been held joint tort-feasors, the former being held liable to the United States for half
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for escaping liability,90 the court determined that, on the facts and the law
as it then appeared, the claimant was reasonably justified in making the settle-
ment when abandoned by the insurer to his own devices, and was consequently
entitled to judgment against the State for the total sum paid by him.
It would seem that the New York courts, which have granted indemnity in
the absence of a sweeping indemnity agreement to the passive as against the
active wrongdoer, would also find an exclusion clause ineffective to prevent
reimbursement or indemnity where there existed a concurrent common law
right of indemnification. If it is possible, as was done in Virginia Eng'r Co., to
place emphasis on the intention of the parties when the policy is taken out,
then the exclusion clause should be operative where the insured is liable for
the third-party's negligence solely by an express and sweeping indemnity agree-
ment, but inoperative where insured as an active wrongdoer would on quasi-
contractual principles be liable to the party who is passively negligent.
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
As joint tort-feasors are neither indispensible91 nor conditionally necessary 2
parties, the plaintiff in a negligence action has the option of suing all or only
some of them.93 The question then arises as to whether or not a defendant may
seek contribution and indemnity in the same action from other tort-feasors
involved as codefendants and from those whom plaintiff did not join initially
or, more specifically, whether sections 26494 and 193-a95 of the Civil Practice
Act have in any way changed the common law and statutory rules governing
contribution and indemnity.
damages. The employer could have been held primarily liable to the United States and
wholly required to indemnify it. The employer might have been held liable to indemnify
the United States on a question of fact as to the United States' obligation to repair,
testimony which the trial court might have rejected. The employer bad by contract as-
sumed some liability to indemnify the United States, the meaning of which was unsettled.
Cardinal v. State, 304 N.Y. 400, -, 107 N.E.2d 569, 574 (1952).
90. The court felt that the Fund could have taken on the defense of the impleading
petitions with reservation of its rights against the insured employer or even have defended
against the tort count in the impleading petitions, requiring the employer to defend him-
self as to any contractual claim by the United States if it thought there was any differ-
ence between the tort liability and the contractual obligation, and that in not doing so it
had waived every question of coverage except as to the unfounded monetary limitation.
Id. at -, 107 N.E.2d at 577.
91. Such parties are those whose absence would prevent an effective determination of
the law suit or whose interests not being severable would be adversely affected by a
judgment rendered between the parties in the action. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 193(1).
The joinder of such parties is absolutely necessary, for unless they are brought before
the court it lacks power to adjudicate the case. Appleton, New York Practice 62 (5th
ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as Appleton].
92. Such parties ought to be joined in order to give complete relief to the parties in
the action. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 193(1). Absence of such parties still permits adjudica-
tion of the case. Appleton 63.
93. Since the liability of joint tort-feasors is joint and several, they are proper parties
and their joinder cannot be compelled. Appleton 72.
94. See note 8 supra.
95. Ibid.
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Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines2 0 made it clear that section 193-a
has not changed the statutory rule governing contribution among joint tort-
feasors. 7 If the plaintiff does not choose to join all the joint tort-feasors in one
action, the defendant has no right of contribution or impleader, nor a right
to assert a cross-claim.2 8 However, where the question is one of indemnity
either on an express agreement or on the principles of active-passive negligence,
impleader or allowance of a cross-claim if the tort-feasors had been joined
by the plaintiff is sometimes permittedP9  Brady v. Stanley Weiss & Sons'01
has shown that a cross-claim will be allowed if on the facts alleged it is possible
that the defendant could be liable to the plaintiff on grounds which would
entitle him to indemnity from a third-party. Such a situation is illustrated
where the complaint charges both active and passive negligence, and a trial is
necessary to determine if the plaintiff's recovery will be based on a finding of
active or passive negligence or both. Coffey v. Flo-wer City Carting & Excavat-
ing Co.,' o' however, indicated that where a claim alleges active negligence on
the part of the defendant a cross-claim is improper.
A similar rule applies in the case of impleader. In Middleton v. City of New
York 0 2 the complaint, alleging that a municipality had been negligent in
maintaining a highway, prayed recovery for damages sustained when plaintiff's
truck ran into a large accumulation of water and he lost control of the vehicle.
The defendant sought to implead the railroad, alleging that by negligently
maintaining its right of way it had caused the water to accumulate on the
highway. The third-party complaint was dismissed, indicating that the court
felt the pleadings were sufficient to establish the municipality as actively negli-
gent or charged with sufficient notice as to be equally liable with the railroad.
This case was an exception to the general trend of municipality cases.
Should the court in permitting or refusing a cross-claim or impleader look
only to the original complaint, or will it consider matters extraneous to the com-
plaint? 0 3 This problem was considered recently in Putvin v. Buffalo Eke.
96. 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931).
97. The court determined that N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 211-a applied only when the plain-
tiff joined both defendants in the same action and recovered a joint judgment against
both of them and one had paid more than his share. Since impleader is available only
where the third-party is under a duty to reimburse the defendant for any recovery in the
main action, the court felt that when the plaintiff chooses to sue only some of the tort-
feasors actively responsible for his injury there is no duty of contribution and conse-
quently no right of impleader.
98. See 2 Carmody & Wait § 65.
99. 2 Carmody & Wait § 65. See also Prosser § 46.
100. 6 App. Div. 2d 241, 175 N.Y.S.2d 850 (4th Dep't 1958).
101. 2 App. Div. 2d 191, 153 N.Y.S.2d 763 (4th Dep't 1956), aff'd mem, 2 N.Y.2d 893,
141 N.E2d 632, 161 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1957).
102. 276 App. Div. 780, 92 N.Y.S.2d 655 (2d Dep't 1949), aff'd mem., 300 N.Y. 732, 92
N.E.2d 312 (1950). See Note, 39 Cornell L.Q. 484, 486-87 (1954).
103. Early cases ruled out impleader when the plaintiff's complaint alleged active
negligence, albeit later causes of action alleged negligence which would only be p asive.
See, e.g., Nichols v. Clark, ,lachlullen & Riley, Inc., 261 N.Y. 118, 184 N.E. 729 (1933).
It would seem that this whole problem should have been alleviated by enactment of §
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Co. 04 In affirming the dismissal of the third-party complaints, the court of
appeals pointed out that defendant's right to implead depended upon his ability
to demonstrate a right of indemnification. It stated the accepted rule:
[A] claim over against a third person charging the third person with active negligence
will be allowed if the original complaint can reasonably be interpreted as including
an allegation of passive negligence on the part of a defendant .... Conversely, where
the defendant is alleged to be guilty only of active, as distinguished from passive
negligence, impleader is improper as a matter of law, since an actively negligent
tort-feasor is not entitled to indemnity . . . . If the then defendant is alleged to
be guilty of both active and passive negligence impleader of the person claimed
to be guilty of active negligence is proper ... .o0
In a dissent, Judge Van Voorhis, however, pointed out that it was premature
to dismiss the third-party complaints before the basis of recovery, if any,
which could be awarded at the trial to the original plaintiffs against the third-
party plaintiff, was known.10
Criticism
Skillful use of the notice to admit'07 and bills of particulars" could
obviate many difficulties by forcing the plaintiff to amend his complaint to
show passive negligence on the part of the defendant. Nevertheless, as al-
lowance of cross-claims and third-party practice was designed to remedy the
waste of time and money involved in multiple trials and to avoid the unseemly
spectacle of inconsistent verdicts on the same set of facts,10 9 it is certainly
questionable whether dismissal of the cross-complaint before trial where the
original complaint alleges facts which if proven would constitute active negli-
gence does not defeat the purpose of impleader. It might be argued that if the
defendant were found liable on the theory of active negligence as alleged in
193-a which dispensed with the previous requirement that the main action and the claim
over be the same or based upon the same grounds so long as there was a common question
of law or fact, and emphasized that defendant must show that the third-party "is or may
be liable over," dismissal of the third-party action being discretionary. The difficulty still
remains, the courts relying on the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint. See, e.g., Ruping
v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 283 App. Div. 204, 126 N.Y.S.2d 687 (3d Dep't 1953);
Kennedy v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 282 App. Div. 1001, 125 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't 1953),
aff'd mem., 307 N.Y. 875, 122 N.E.2d 753 (1954); Valdale Apartments v. Ercito Mazzella
Constr., Inc., 115 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. -Ct. 1952).
As to how much should be read into the complaint, the courts have taken different
views. In Kloppenberg v. Brooklyn Union Gas. Co., 82 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. 1948), the
court pointed out that the plaintiff's complaint should indicate some basis of recovery for
passive negligence in order for the defendant's impleader to lie. Cf. Employer's Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Fairchild Press, Inc., 279 App. Div. 895, ill N.Y.S.2d 604 (Ist Dep't 1952),
where impleader was allowed.
104. 5 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E.2d 691, 186 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1959).
105. Id. at 455, 158 N.E.2d at 695, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 21. (Emphasis added.)
106. Id. at 460, 158 N.E.2d at 698, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
107. For a discussion of this procedure see Appleton 214-15.
108. See Appleton 152-53.
109. Appleton 67-68.
the complaint no impleader would lie, and if he were not liable impleader would
be superfluous. However, if it is true, as the court in Walkozwicz v. Whilney's,
Inc.110 stated "in many nuisance and negligence actions, the idea that the
complaint contains a precise and concise statement of all the material facts
must be regarded as partly a fiction," it would seem that a more reasonable
approach would be to allow impleader and defer third-party defendant's motion
to dismiss, pending a factual presentation at trial, if from defendant's third-
party complaint, together with plaintiff's complaint, it appears that there is a
possible situation for indemnity.i Sections 193-a and 264 of the Civil Practice
Act were intended as remedial procedures and only by liberal interpretation
will the sections afford full relief, prevent a multiplicity of law suits, avoid a
circuity of action and achieve the legislative purpose that led to their enact-
ment. The only exception to allowing a claim over should be where there is a
possibility that its interposition will unduly delay the main action and preju-
dice the plaintiff.
It would also be desirable to lighten the difficulties surrounding the assertion
of claims against other tort-feasors by amending section 211-a of the Civil Prac-
tice Act to allow impleader and cross-claims for purposes of contribution, that
is, create a right of contribution between some tort-feasors without the necessity
of joint judgment, thereby perhaps restoring the distinction between negligence
and misconduct that was once observed regarding the right of contribution. 12
110. 178 Iisc. 331, 333,34 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (Sup. CL 1942).
111. In Bergman v. George, 202 Misc. 998, 1003, 117 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30 (Sup. Ct. 1932),
the court said: "But the allegations of the main complaint are not determinative at this
point; it is alleged in the third-party complaint that control was in fact in the im-
pleaded defendant and this allegation too must be taken into consideration in passing
upon the issues as a matter of pleading." In Pike v. Balmar Constr. Co., 104 X.YS2d 569,
570-71 (Sup. Ct. 1951), the court said: "It is not the province of the Court on a motion
of this kind to speculate upon the possible factual presentations at the trial. It is sufficient
that it appears from the pleadings that a jury might return a verdict against the general
contractor or on a theory of passive negligence which would permit recovery over against
the sub-contractor." See also Johnson v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 278 App. Div. 626,
101 N.Y.S.2d 922 (3d Dep't 1951); Korycka v. S.A. Healy Co., 5 Misc. 2d 598, 10 N.YS.
2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1957). The right to indemnification must be apparent in the third-party
complaint, otherwise it will be dismissed. See, e.g., Wolf v. La Rosa & Sons, Inc., 272 App.
Div. 932, 71 N.Y.S.2d 320 (2d Dep't 1947), aff'd mem., 298 N.Y. 597, 81 N.E.2d 329 (1948).
For a similar requirement for the cross-claim see, e.g., Shass v. Abgold Realty Corp., 277
App. Div. 346, 100 N.Y.S.2d 121 (2d Dep't 1950). As to how much should be read into
the cross-complaint see Note, 39 Cornell L.Q. 484, 495-96 (1954).
112. See note 5 supra. There seems to be no necessity of abolishing the rule against
contribution in cases of wilful wrongdoing or flagrant misconducL Prosser § 46. That
this might be the solution is suggested by virtue of the fact that the courts may have
in many instances awarded indemnity for inability to grant contribution where plaintiff
had failed to join the second tort-feasor in the original action. See Note, 39 Cornell L.Q.
484, 500 (1954).
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